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This collection of contributions to the study of tax compliance was compiled as part of an 
Economic and Social Research Council funded project which formally took place from 
March 2006 to August 2007. It builds on a great deal of earlier work – most notably by 
Ahmed et al. (2003), Evans (2003a), Fischer et al. (1992), Jackson and Milliron, (1986), 
Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). These invaluable sources gave not 
only perspectives from Accounting, Economics, Law and Psychology but also from 
America, Australasia and Europe. 
 
Although the entries were compiled for the purpose of the project, as it became clear that 
this collection might be of use to others, as earlier collections were to us, further 
information has been added. Where indicated, full abstracts can be found in Ahmed et al. 
(2003) and it also seemed helpful to indicate when the contribution was cited in one of 
the above sources since this usually involved more information or comment or both. 
 
Although it has been tidied up to assist, hopefully, other users, the collection remains 
essentially a working document and there is no claim that it is a complete collection of all 
the relevant contributions. It was hoped to add more but as time passes it seemed best to 
make the bibliography available to others without further delay. 
 
As many of the contributions cover more than one topic, the contributions are presented 
in alphabetical order by first author. Electronic searching seems to make the addition of 
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Ahmed, E., McCrae, J., Braithwaite, V. and Sakurai, Y. (2003), Bringing It Together  
(BIT), Vol.1; An Annotated Bibliography relating to voluntary tax compliance.  
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/taxpubs/annotated.bibiography.pdf 
accessed 20 October 2007. 
 
Evans, Chris (2003a), ‘Studying the studies: An overview of recent research into taxation 
operating costs’, eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 1(1), pp. 64-92. 
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Fischer, C., Wartick, M. and Mark, M. (1992), ‘Detection probability and taxpayer 
compliance: A literature review’, Journal of Accounting Literature, vol. 11(1), pp. 1-46 
 
Jackson, B. and Milliron, V.C. (1986), ‘Tax compliance research: Findings, problems and 
prospects’, Journal of Accounting Literature, vol. 5, pp. 125-165. 
 
Kirchler, Erich (2007), The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Richardson, M and Sawyer, A. (2001), ‘A taxonomy of tax compliance literature: Further 











Aaron, Henry J. and Slemrod, Joel, (eds.) (2004), The Crisis in Tax Administration, 
Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC. 
Includes chapters relevant to compliance: ‘The tax shelter battle’ by Joseph Bankman; 
‘Issues of international tax enforcement’ by David R. Tillinghast; ‘Small business and the 
tax system’, by Joel Slemrod; ‘The turbo tax revolution: Can technology solve tax 
complexity’ by Austan Goolshee; ‘Issues affecting low-income filers’, by Janet 
Holtzblatt and Janet McCubbin; ‘Tax preparers’, by Marsha Blumenthal and Charles 
Christian; ‘Carrots and sticks in enforcement’ by Frank Cowell; ‘ Effects of tax 
simplification options: A quantitative analysis’, by William G. Gale and Jeffrey Rohaly; 
‘Ultimate objectives for the IRS: Balancing revenue and service’, Alan H. Plumley and 
C. Eugene Steuerle; and ‘Experience and innovations in other countries’, Jeffrey Owens 
and Stuart Hamilton. 
 
 
Adams, Caroline and Webley, Paul (2001), ‘Small business owners’ attitudes on VAT 
compliance in the UK’, Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 22(2), pp. 195-216. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
 
 
Adelsheim, Peter, D. and Zanetti, James L. (2006), ‘The effect of targeted outreach on 
compliance’, in Recent Research on Tax Administration and Compliance: Selected 
Papers Given at the 2006 IRS Research Conference, Statistics of Income Division, 
Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Washington DC, pp. 213-239. 
 
 
Agell, Jonas and Persson, Mats (1990), ‘Tax arbitrage and the redistributive properties of 
progressive income taxation’, Economics Letters, vol. 34(4), pp. 357-361. 
This paper demonstrates that it is possible for tax arbitrage to reduce inequality. 
 
 
Agell, Jonas and Persson, Mats (2000), ‘Tax arbitrage and labor supply’, Journal of 
Public Economics, vol. 78(1-2), 3-24. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
 
 
Agell, Jonas, Persson, Mats and Sacklén (2004), ‘The effects of tax reform on labor 
supply, tax revenue and welfare when tax avoidance matters’, European Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 20(4), pp. 963-982. 
The authors show that failing to account for avoidance responses can lead to substantial 
errors when analyzing how tax reform affects labour supply, tax revenue and the welfare 
cost of taxation.  
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Ahmed, E. and Braithwaite, V. (2004), ‘Understanding small business taxpayers: Issues 
of deterrence, tax morale, fairness and work practice’, International Small Business 
Journal, vol. 23(5), pp. 539-568. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
 
 
Ahmed, E. and Braithwaite, V. (2005), ‘A need for emotionally intelligent policy: 
Linking tax evasion with higher education funding’, Legal and Criminal Psychology,  
vol. 10(2), pp. 291-308. 
 
 
Ahmed, E. and Braithwaite, V. (2007), ‘Higher education loans and tax evasion: A 
response to perceived unfairness’, Law and Policy, vol. 29(1), pp. 121-136. 
Demonstrates how perceptions of government policy in one area may affect cooperation 
with government in other areas. 
 
 
Ahmed, E., McCrae, J., Braithwaite, V. and Sakurai, Y. (2003), Bringing It Together  
(BIT), Vol.1; An Annotated Bibliography relating to voluntary tax compliance.  
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/taxpubs/annotated.bibiography.pdf 
accessed 20 October 2007. 
An annotated bibliography bringing together the research collections of the Centre for 
Tax System Integrity at the Australian National University and the Knowledge 
Development Network of the Australian Taxation Office. The bibliography is restricted 
to materials that are concerned with tax compliance or ideas relevant to tax compliance 
such as regulatory compliance in general and justice. The bibliography is arranged in 10 
parts as follows: 
Part 1 - An evaluation of the tax system organized around issues such as administrative 
fairness including procedural justice, legitimacy, trust and the power to influence 
businesses. 
Part 2 - Institutional demands including deterrence, conflict with tax authorities and the 
likely monetary and psychological costs of non-compliance. 
Part 3 – Sources of influence including studies of factors such as self-perception, for 
example of a personal ethic norm of honesty and perceptions of others including tax 
advisers, for instance a social ethical norm of honesty. 
Part 4 - The cash economy. 
Part 5 – Policy issues such as studies that challenge current regulatory practice and 
propose improvements to the current tax system. 
Part 6 – Theoretical contributions including reviews of the relevant literature from a 
methodological or theoretical perspective.  
Part 7 – Contributions relating to the work of researchers of the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity in the development of a voluntary taxpaying culture but which do not fit readily 
into the preceding parts. 
Part 8 – Econometric papers. 
Part 9 – Centre for Tax System Integrity working papers. 
Part 10 – Edited Collections on tax compliance.   6 
 
 
Ajzen, I. and Fishbein (1977), ‘Attitude-behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and 
review of empirical research’, Psychological Bulletin, (September), pp. 888-918. 
Cited in Jackson and Milliron (1986).   
 
 
Allers, Maarten (1994), Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation and Public 
Transfers in the Netherlands, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen. 
Cited in Evans (2003a) - empirical work summarized on p. 86.  
 
 
Allers, Maarten, (1995), ‘Tax compliance costs in the Netherlands’, in C. Sandford (ed.), 
Taxation Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy, Fiscal Publications, Bath,  
pp. 173-195. 
Cited in Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
This chapter focuses on methodology but also summarizes the results of surveys into 
compliance costs to business and personal taxpayers in the Netherlands (Allers, 1994). 
  
 
Alley, Clinton and James, Simon (2006), ‘Research into the economic and behavioural  
approaches in tax compliance’ in Taxation Issues in the Twenty-First Century, edited by 
Adrian Sawyer, Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law, University of Canterbury, 
New Zealand, pp. 3-14. 
 
 
Allingham, Michael, G. and Sandmo, Agnar, (1972), ‘Income tax evasion: A theoretical 
analysis’, Journal of Public Economics, vol.1, pp. 323-338. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999), Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Kirchler (2007). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 148 and included in the annotated bibliography in 
Fischer et al. (1992), p. 41. 
 
 
Alm, James (1988), ‘Compliance costs and the tax avoidance-tax evasion decision’, 
Public Finance Quarterly, vol. 16, pp. 31-66. 
Cited in Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Alm, James (1991), ‘A perspective on the experimental analysis of taxpayer reporting’, 
The Accounting Review, vol. 55(3), pp. 577-593. 
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Alm, James (1999), ‘Tax compliance and administration’, in W. Bartley Hildreth and 




Alm, James, Bahl, Roy and Murray, Matthew N. (1990), ‘Tax structure and tax 
compliance’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 72(4), pp. 603-614. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), pp. 35-36. 
A model of individual tax compliance behaviour is developed and estimated. The model 
recognizes the importance of marginal income tax rates, payroll tax contributions and 
benefits, the probability of detection and the penalty on unpaid taxes with  respect to tax 
evasion and avoidance. 
 
 
Alm, James, Bahl, Roy and Murray, Matthew N. (1993), ‘Audit selection and income tax 
under-reporting in the tax compliance game’, Journal of Development Economics,  
vol. 42(1), pp. 1-33. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
This paper employs a game-theoretic model of the tax compliance game to estimate a 
model of audit selection and income tax underreporting in Jamaica. 
 
 
Alm, James and Beck, William (1990), ‘Tax amnesties and tax revenues’, Public Finance 
Quarterly, vol. 18, pp. 433-453. 
Cited in Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Alm, James and Beck, William (1991), ‘Wiping the slate clean: Individual response to 
state tax amnesties’, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 57, pp. 1043-1053. 
Cited in Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Alm, James and Beck, William (1993), ‘Tax amnesties and compliance in the long run: A 
time series analysis’, National Tax Journal, vol. 46(1), pp. 53-60. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Alm, James, Blackwell, Calvin and McKee, Michael, (2004), ‘Audit selection and firm 
compliance with a broad based sales tax’, National Tax Journal, vol 57(2), pp. 209-227. 
 
Alm, James, Cherry, Todd, Jones, Michael and McKee, Michael (2010), ‘Taxpayer 
information assistance services and tax compliance behavior’, Journal of Economic 
Psychology, vol. 31(3), pp. 577-586.   8 
 
 
Alm, James, Cronshaw, Mark B. and McKee, Michael (1993), ‘Tax compliance with 
endogenous audit selection rules’, Kyklos, vol. 46(1), pp. 27-45. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Alm, James, Deskins, John, and McKee, Michael (2006), Third-Party Income Reporting 
and Income Tax Compliance, Research Paper Series, Working Paper 06-35, Andrew 
Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. 
 
 
Alm, James and Erard, Brian (2005), ‘Estimating the informal supplier tax gap’, in 
Recent Research on Tax Administration and Compliance: Proceedings of the 2005 IRS 
Research Conference, Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, 
Department of the Treasury, Washington DC, pp. 27-43. 
Informal suppliers are those who provide goods or services informally which frequently 
involve cash payments or are ‘off the books’. 
 
 
Alm, James, Erard Brian and Feinstein, Jonathan S. (1996), ‘The relationship between 
state and federal tax audits’ in Martin Feldstein and James M. Poterba (eds.), Empirical 
Foundations of Household Taxation, University of Chicago Press. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999). 
 
Alm, James and Gomez, Juan Luis (2008), ‘Social Capital and tax morale in Spain’, 
Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 38(1), pp. 73-87. 
 
Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (1992), ‘Deterrence and beyond: 
Toward a kinder, gentler IRS’, in Joel Slemrod (ed.) Why People Pay Taxes: Tax 
Compliance and Enforcement, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan,  
pp. 311-329. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (1992), ‘Estimating the determinants 
of taxpayer compliance with experimental data’, National Tax Journal, vol. 45(1),  
pp. 107-14. 
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Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (1992), ‘’Institutional uncertainty 
and taxpayer compliance’, American Economic Review, vol. 82(4), pp. 1018-26. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999) Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 123. 
This paper questions the conclusion that taxpayer uncertainty increases compliance. 
 
 
Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (1993), ‘Fiscal exchange, collective 
decision institutions and tax compliance’, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, vol. 22(3), pp. 285-303. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee Michael, (2004), -The effects of 
communications among taxpayers on compliance’, in The IRS Research Bulletin: 
Proceedings of the 2004 IRS Research Conference, Statistics of Income Division, 
Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Washington DC, pp. 37-46. 
 
Alm, James, Jackson, Betty R. and McKee, Michael (2009), ‘Getting the word out: 
enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior’, Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 93(3-4), pp. 392-402. 
 
Alm, James and Jacobson, Sarah (2007), ‘Using laboratory experiments in public 
economics’, National Tax Journal, vol. 60(1), pp. 129-152. 




Alm, James, Jones, Michael and McKee, Michael (2007), ‘Taxpayer services and 
taxpayer compliance’, in Recent Research on Tax Administration and Compliance: 
Selected Papers Given at the 2007 IRS Research Conference, Statistics of Income 




Alm, James and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge (2007), Tax Morale and Tax Evasion in Latin 
America, International Studies Program, Working Paper 07-04, Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta. 
 
Alm, James, Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Wallace, Sally (2009), ‘Do tax amnesties 
work? The revenue effects of tax amnesties during the transition in the Russian 
Federation’, Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 39(2), pp. 234-253.   10 
 
 
Alm, James, McClelland, Gary H. and Schulze, William D. (1992), ‘Why do people pay 
taxes?’ Journal of Public Economics, vol. 48(1), pp. 21-38. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999), Fischer et al. (1992), Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and 
Sawyer (2001). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 30. 
This paper presents experimental results that suggest some taxpayers comply because 
they overestimate the low probability of an audit. There is also evidence that individuals 
comply because they value the public goods their tax payments purchase. 
 
 
Alm, James, McClelland, Gary H. and Schulze, William D. (1999), ‘Changing the social 
norm of tax compliance by voting’, Kyklos, vol. 52(2), pp. 141-171. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
 
 
Alm, James and McKee, Michael (1998), ‘Extending the lessons of laboratory 
experiments on tax compliance to managerial and decision economics’, Managerial and 
Decision Economics, vol. 19(4/5), pp. 259-275. 
 
 
Alm, James and McKee, Michael (2004), ‘Tax compliance as a coordination game’, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 54(3), pp. 297-312. 
 
 
Alm, James and McKee, Michael (2006), ‘Audit certainty, audit productivity and 
taxpayer compliance’, National Tax Journal, vol. 59(4), pp. 752-753. 
 
 
Alm, James, McKee, Michael J. and Beck, William (1990), ‘Amazing grace: Tax 
amnesties and tax compliance’, National Tax Journal, vol. 43(1), pp. 23-37. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999), Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), pp. 101-2 and 163. 
This paper uses experimental methods to analyze the long run impact of an amnesty. It 
finds that the average level of compliance falls after an amnesty but if post-amnesty 
enforcement increases aggregate compliance also increases. In fact, post-amnesty 
compliance is higher when an amnesty is companied by increased enforcement than when 
enforcement increases without an amnesty. 
 
 
Alm, James, Sanchez, Isabel and de Juan Anna (1995), ‘Economic and noneconomic 
factors in tax compliance’, Kyklos, vol. 48(1), pp. 3-18.  
Cited in Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
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Alm, James and Torgler, Benno (2006), ‘Culture differences and tax morale in the United 
States and in Europe’, Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 27(2), pp. 224-246. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
 
 
Alm, James and Yunus, Mohammad (2009), ‘Spatiality and persistence in U.S. individual 
tax compliance’, National Tax Journal, vol. 62, March, pp. 101-124. 
 
 
Anderhub, V., Giese, S. Güth, W., Hoffmann, A. and Otto, T. (2001), ‘Tax evasion with 
earned income: An experimental study’, Finanz Archiv, vol. 58(2), pp. 188-206. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
 
 
Andreoni, James (1991a), ‘The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty’, Journal of 
Public Economics, vol. 45(2), pp. 143-159. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999) and Kirchler (2007). 
 
 
Andreoni, James (1991b), ‘Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: Should 
the penalty fit the crime?’ Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 22(3), pp. 385-395. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999). 
 
 
Andreoni, James (1992), ‘IRS as loan shark: Tax compliance with borrowing 
constraints’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 49(1), pp. 35-46. 
Cited in Andreoni et al. (1999). 
 
 
Andreoni, James, Erard, Brian and Feinstein, Jonathan (1998), ‘Tax compliance’, Journal 
of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, pp. 818-860. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
Summary in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 115. 
A review of the major theoretical and empirical findings in the recent tax compliance 
literature, focusing solely on personal income tax.  
 
 
Andresen, Kari Due, Ognedal, Tone and Strøm, Steinar (2005), ‘The shadow economy in 
Norway 1980-2003: Some empirical evidences from voluntary sample surveys’, in 
Christopher Bajada and Friedrich Schneider (eds.) Size, Causes and Consequences of the 
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Antle, R. (1982), ‘The auditor as an economic agent’, Journal of Accounting Research, 
(Autumn), pp. 503-527. 
Cited in Jackson and Milliron (1986).   
 
 
Antonides, G. and Robben, H.S.J. (1995), ‘True positives and false alarms in the 
detection of tax evasion’, Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 16(4), pp. 617-640.  
Cited in Kirchler (2007) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), pp. 58-59. 
In this study 188 taxpayers in the Netherlands were interviewed regarding their 
circumstances, motives and perceptions regarding tax evasion. Information from their tax 
returns was also collected from the tax administration. The results suggest that both social 
and psychological factors were determinants of tax evasion. 
 
 
Appelgren, Leif (2008), ‘The effect of audit strategy information on tax compliance – an 
empirical study’, eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 6(1), pp. 67-81. 




Arachi, Giampaolo and Santoro, Alessandro (2007), ‘Tax enforcement for SMEs: lessons 
from the Italian experience?’ eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 5(2), pp. 225-243. 
 
 
Arena, Peter, O’Hare, John F. and Stavrianos, Michael P. (2003), ‘Measuring taxpayer 
compliance burden: A microsimulation approach’, Proceedings of the 95
th Conference on 
Taxation, National Tax Journal, pp. 333-341. 
 
 
Arendse, Jackie (2010), ‘Is the penalty system in the South African environment an 
effective deterrent to tax evasion?’ paper presented at the 9
th International Tax 
Administration Conference, ATAX, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 7-9 April. 
 
 
Ariff, Mohamed (2001), ‘Compliance cost research in selected Asian economies’, in 
Chris Evans, Jeff Pope and John Hasseldine (eds.)(2001), Tax Compliance Costs: A 
Festschrift for Cedric Sandford, Prospect Media, Sydney, pp. 249-268. 
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Ariff, M., Ismail, Z. and Loh, A. (1997), ‘Compliance costs of corporate income tax in 
Singapore’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 24 (9 and 10) pp. 1253-
1268. 
Cited in Evans (2003a) - empirical work summarized on p. 89  
 
 
Ariff, Mohammed, Loh, Alfred and Talib, Ameen Ali (1995) ‘Compliance costs of 
corporate income tax in Singapore’, Accounting Research Journal, vol. 8(2), pp. 75-87. 
Cited in Evans (2003a) - empirical work summarized on p. 89. 
 
 
Ariff, Mohammed and Pope, Jeff (2002), Taxation and Compliance Costs in the Asia 
Pacific Economies, Universiti Utara Malyasia Press, Sintok, Malaysia.  
 
 
Arnold, Brian J. (1996), ‘Reponses to tax avoidance’, in Malcolm Gammie and Adrian 
Shipwright, (eds.) Striking the Balance: Tax Administration, Enforcement and 
Compliance in the 1990s, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, pp. 201-208. 
A discussion of the Canadian experience with tax avoidance. 
 
 
Arrington, C. and Reckers, P. (1985), ‘A social-psychological investigation into 
perceptions of tax evasion’, Accounting and Business Research, (Summer), pp. 163-176. 
Cited in Jackson and Milliron (1986).   
 
 
Arthur Andersen & Co. (1985), The Administrative and Compliance Costs of the Federal 
Sales Tax System with a Brief Comparison to the Retail Sales Tax System of Ottawa, 
Department of Finance, Ottawa. 
Cited in Evans (2003a) - empirical work summarized on p. 80. 
 
 
Arthur D Little Inc. (1988), Development of Methodology for Estimating the Taxpayer 
Paperwork Burden, Final Report to the Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue 
Service, Washington DC. 
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Ayres, Frances L, Jackson, Betty R. and Hite, Peggy S. (1989), ‘The economic benefits 
of regulation evidence from professional tax preparers’, The Accounting Review, vol. 
64(2), pp. 300-312.  
Cited in Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 64. 
This study examines the degree of consistency in the judgments of tax preparers subject 
to differing degrees of government regulation. In cases with a high degree of uncertainty, 
certified public accountants (CPAs) are found to be consistently more pro-taxpayer in 
their judgments than non-CPA tax practitioners. 
 
 
Aziah, Abdul Manaf Nor and Hijattulah, Abdul Jabbar (2007), ‘A survey of perception 
towards tax evasion as a crime’, in Margaret McKerchar and Michael Walpole (eds.), 
Further Global Challenges in Tax Administration, Fiscal Publications, Birmingham,  
pp. 183-199. 
This paper surveys and analyzes Malaysian citizens’ perception of the seriousness of tax 
evasion relative to other crimes and violations. 
 







Bajada, Christopher (2005a), ‘Recent government initiatives in tackling the underground 
economy in Australia’, in Christopher Bajada and Friedrich Schneider (eds.) Size, Causes 
and Consequences of the Underground Economy: An International Perspective, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, pp. 243-274. 
 
 
Bajada, Christopher (2005b), ‘Tackling the underground economy in the UK: A 
government’s response’, in Christopher Bajada and Friedrich Schneider (eds.) Size, 
Causes and Consequences of the Underground Economy: An International Perspective, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 223-241. 
 
 
Bajada, Christopher and Schneider, Friedrich (eds.)(2005), Size, Causes and 
Consequences of the Underground Economy: An International Perspective, Ashgate, 
Aldershot.  
This collection of papers is divided into three parts. Part I addresses taxpayer behaviour 
and motivations. Part 2 is concerned with international evidence regarding the 




Baldry, J.C. (1984), ‘The enforcement of income tax laws: Efficiency implications’ 
Economic Record, vol. 60, issue 169, pp. 156-159. 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 186. 
It is shown that total enforcement of income tax law reducing income tax evasion to zero 
is inefficient. Full compliance can only be optimal if the tax structure is rigid.  
 
 
Baldry, J.C. (1986), ‘Tax evasion is not a gamble: A report on two experiments’, 
Economics Letters, vol. 22, pp. 333-335. 
Cited in Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Baldry, Jonathan C. (1987), ‘Income tax evasion and the tax schedule: Some 
experimental results’, Public Finance, vol. 42(3), pp. 357-383. 
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Baldry, Jonathan C. (1994), ‘Economic analysis and taxpayer compliance: Time for a 
new agenda’, Australian Tax Forum, vol. 11(1), pp. 45-62. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 120. 
This paper surveys some of the major achievements and failures of economists in the area 
of tax compliance, considers the reasons for the failures and suggests a number of 
changes to make the analysis more relevant to current tax compliance issues. In particular 




Balestrino, Alessandro and Galmarini, Umberto (2003), ‘Imperfect tax compliance and 
the optimal provision of public goods’, Bulletin of Economic Research, vol. 55(1),  
pp. 37-52. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
It is argued that imperfect income tax compliance implies it is desirable that the supply of 
public goods should be distorted downwards. 
 
 
Bankman, Joseph (2004), ‘The tax shelter battle’ in Henry J. Aaron, and Joel Slemrod, 
Joel, (eds.), The Crisis in Tax Administration, Brookings Institution Press, Washington 
DC, pp. 9-28. 
Tax shelters are considered to be structured transactions with little or no independent 
business purpose. This chapter describes the modern tax shelter, discusses some of its 
effects and evaluates government use to curb the use of tax shelters. 
 
 




Bannock, Graham (2001), ‘Can small scale surveys of compliance costs work?’ in Chris 
Evans, Jeff Pope and John Hasseldine (eds.)(2001), Tax Compliance Costs: A Festschrift 
for Cedric Sandford, Prospect Media, Sydney, pp. 87-96. 
 
 
Bannock, G. and Albach, H. (1989), ‘The compliance costs of VAT for smaller firms in 
Britain and West Germany’ in G. Bannock and A. Peacock (eds.) Governments and Small 
Business, Paul Chapman, London, pp. 182-228. 
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Bardach, E. (1989), ‘Moral suasion and taxpayer compliance’, Law and Policy, vol. 
11(1), pp.49-69. 
Cited in Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), pp. 39-40 and 129. 
Compliance might increase if taxpayers are presented with the right ‘moral appeals’. This 
paper examines the justification for such appeals.  
 
 
Bardsley, P. (1994), ‘Tax compliance research: An economic perspective on the research 
agenda’, Australian Tax Forum, vol. 11, pp. 271-290. 
Cited in Richardson and Sawyer (2001). 
 
 
Bardsley, P. (1996), ‘Tax compliance games with imperfect auditing’ Public Finance, 
vol. 51(4), pp. 473-489. 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 174. 
 
 
Barnett, Harold C. (1986) ‘Industry culture and industry economy: Correlates of tax 
noncompliance in Sweden’, Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Journal, vol. 3(4), pp. 
553-574. 
Abstract in Ahmed et al. (2003), p. 19. 
Uses the concepts of industry culture and industry economy to examine differential 
noncompliance with tax law across Swedish industry in the early 1980s. 
 
 
Barr, Michael, S. and Dokko, Jane K. (2006), ‘Tax filing experiences and withholding 
preferences of low- and moderate-income households: Preliminary evidence from a new 
survey’, in Recent Research on Tax Administration and Compliance: Selected Papers 
Given at the 2006 IRS Research Conference, Statistics of Income Division, Internal 
Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Washington DC, pp. 193-210. 
 
 
Bartelsman, E.J. and Beetsma, R.M.W.J. (2003), ‘’Why pay more: Corporate tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries’ Journal of Public Economics, vol. 
87(9-10), pp. 2,225-52. 
Cited in Kirchler (2007). 
 
 
Bartley, Scott and Wirth, Andrew (2008), ‘Integrating complexity and compliance costs 
considerations into tax policy’, Safe Harbours and New Horizons, 8
th International Tax 
Administration Conference, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, 27-28 
March, Sydney. 
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Bauman, Christine C., Luna, David and Peracchio, Laura A. (2005), ‘Improving tax 
compliance with effective consumer communication’ in Recent Research on Tax 
Administration and Compliance: Proceedings of the 2005 IRS Research Conference, 
Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, 
Washington DC, pp. 247-273. 
 
 
Beck, Paul J., Davis, Jon S. and Jung, Woon-Oh (1991), ‘Experimental evidence on 
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